




Analyzing Causality:  The Opposite of Counterfactual is Factual​[1]​
Jim Bogen, University of Pittsburgh
	i.	  Elizabeth Anscombe used to say the trouble with Utilitarian explanations of moral notions is that no one understands happiness well enough to use it to explain anything.  I think the project of using counterfactuals to explain causality is no more promising—not because we don’t know enough about counterfactuals, but because what we do know argues against their telling us much about causality.  I’ll illustrate my reasons for thinking this by raising objections to the best counterfactual account of causality I know of--Jim Woodward’s Counterfactual Dependency account (CDep).  If it fails, other counterfactual accounts should fare no better.​[2]​ 
   What I will be criticizing is the idea that whether one thing, causes, or makes a causal contribution to the production of another depends not just on what actually is, or has been, or turns out later on to be the case, but also upon what  would have been, or would be or would turn out to be  the case had things been otherwise than they actually were.  I am not arguing against using counterfactuals for other purposes.  For example, I don’t see anything wrong with the use to which counterfactuals are put in Bayes net methods for identifying causal structures reflected in statistical data, and for evaluating policy proposals. (Pearl [200], Spirtes et al [2000])  The difference between this and the appeals to counterfactuals to analyze or explicate causality I object to should become clear 
in §iii below. 
	ii. 	Woodward's Counterfactual Dependency Account of Causality. What  is it for a change in the value​[3]​ of something, Y, to be due, entirely or in part, to a causal influence exerted on Y by something, X?  Woodward’s answer is driven largely by the following two intuitions.   
	1	A good causal explanation (unlike a mere description) of the production 
		of an effect tells us which items to manipulate in order to control or modify 
		the system which produced the effect. 
This idea is essential to Woodward’s account of a causal mechanism. (Woodward 2000] p.10) 
	2	If X exerts a causal influence on Y, one can wiggle Y by wiggling X,  
         while when one wiggles Y, X remains unchanged.’ If X and Y are 
         related only as effects of a common cause C, then neither changes 
         when one wiggles the other, ‘but both can be changed by 
         manipulating C’.(Hausman and  Woodward [1999] p.533) 

According to CDep, this is
…a crucial fact about causation which is deeply embedded in both ordinary thinking and in methods of scientific inquiry. (Woodward and Hausman [1999] p.11) 

As I understand it, 1. and 2.  are supposed to be equivalent, or nearly so (ibid).  
What these intuitions tell us about the difference between a causal and a non-causal relation between X and Y depends on how we are to understand the ‘can’ in ‘one can wiggle Y by wiggling X’ and ‘both can be changed by manipulating C’, and how we are to understand the phrase ‘when one wiggles Y, X remains unchanged’?  Conditionals of some sort must be used to unpack all of this.  What is characteristic of  Woodward’s approach is that the conditionals he chooses are counterfactuals.  If  X caused, or causally contributed to a change in the value of Y, says Woodward, the relation which actually obtained between the values of X and Y when the effect of interest occurred 
…would continue to hold in a similar way under some specified class of interventions or for specified changes of background condition….(Woodward [1993] p.311) 

Thus X exerts a causal influence on Y only if the values of the latter depend counterfactually on values of the former.  
   To illustrate, suppose that while a very smooth block is sliding down a very smooth inclined plane, we change the angle of the incline, and that when we do, the acceleration of the block changes.  Whether the change in had any causal influence on the acceleration depends upon whether the relation which actually obtained between them would have stayed the same if interventions on  t had changed its magnitude to values falling within a ‘suitably large’ range of different magnitudes​[4]​ without doing anything else to influence the acceleration (e.g., roughing up the plane to increase friction).  The counterfactual relation between interventions and results in question is a = g sin g cos  where a is the acceleration of the block.  If the correlation between angle of incline and acceleration had been coincidental rather than causal, or due to a common cause, the relation which actually obtained between a and in the actual case would not  have held if the relevant interventions had been performed. 
    More generally, If X exerts a causal influence on Y, values of Y must vary counterfactually with values (within a certain range which need not be very wide, let alone unlimited) conferred on X by interventions.(Woodward [2000] p.6)  Thus whether or not X caused or made a causal contribution to a change in the value of Y depends in part  on the truth values of counterfactual claims about what would have resulted if interventions which in fact did not occur had occurred.  Woodward says his account captures the importance of counterfactuals about the results of interventions which were not actually performed   
…directly by building this counterfactual component into the content of causal claims.(Woodward [2000] p.11)        
 
   In common parlance, interventions are manipulations undertaken to investigate causal connections, or to influence the value of one thing by changing the value of another. An intervention on X with respect to Y is a manipulation of the value of X undertaken to change the value of Y, or to see what influence, if any, X exerts on Y.  Woodward uses ‘intervention’ as a technical term for ideal manipulations which need not be achievable in practice. (And as in the example of the tides, below, the value of the manipulated item may be set by a natural process which involves no human agency.  (Woodward [2000] p.6).  But for simplicity, I will concentrate on manipulations performed by human agents.)  In order to count as an intervention on X with respect to Y, the manipulation must occur in such a way that 
	3	.	immaculate manipulation requirement:  if the value of Y changes, it does 
		so only because of the change in the value of X, or—if X influences Y  
       indirectly--because of changes in 	intermediate factors brought about by 
       the change in the value of X.
If the value of Y changes because of exogenous influences which operate independently of the manipulation, the manipulation is not a Woodwardian intervention on X with respect to Y.  For example, the administration of a flu vaccine to someone just before she inhales enough goldenrod pollen to cause a severe asthma attack is not a Woodwardian intervention on the subject’s immune system with respect to bronchial constriction.  A manipulation of X which changes the values of other things which influence Y, and does so in a way which does not depend upon the change it brings about in the value of X does not qualify as an intervention on X with respect to Y. (Woodward [1997] p.2). Suppose for example that you apply a powerful vacuum pump to the high end of an inclined plane to change the angle of incline, , and in so doing, you lower the air pressure just uphill from the block sufficiently to change its acceleration independently of the change in .  (The block is sucked right off the plane and into the vacuum hose).  This manipulation does not qualify as an intervention on   with regard to the acceleration of the block. 
    Immaculate manipulations are possible only if X and  Y belong to a system (which may consist of nothing more than X and Y) which meets the following condition.
	4		Modularity:  The parts of the system to which X and Y belong must 
		operate 	independently enough to allow an exogenous cause to change the 
		value of  	X without changing other parts of the system (or the environment 
		in which it operates) in such a way as to 	disrupt any regularities that would otherwise have obtained between variations in the values of X and Y. (Woodward [2000] p.15)  
For example suppose the mutual gravitational attraction of the heavenly bodies makes it impossible for anything to change the moon’s distance from the earth enough to increase or diminish its influence on the tides without changing the positions of other heavenly bodies so that their influence on tides increases or diminishes significantly.  Because the resulting value of the tides would inevitably reflect  the influence of the other heavenly bodies, the change in the distance from the earth cannot qualify as an intervention with respect to the tides. (Woodward and Hausman ([1999] n 12, p.537). 
	iii		 Many of the systems experimentalists actually study fail the modularity requirement.  In many other cases experimentalists lack the tools required to perform anything better than non immaculate manipulations which Kevin Kelly calls fat handed.  (For an example, see §v below.)  As a result it’s extremely difficult to find real world examples to illustrate what a Woodwardian interventions would actually look like in practice.  Although it’s easy to come up with toy examples, I think the best way to understand what  Woodward means by interventions is to think of them as imaginary experimental maneuvers which correspond to assignments of values to the nodes of the  directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) which Judea Pearl, Peter Spirtes, Clark Glymour, Richard Scheiness, and others use to represent causal structures.(Pearl [2000] pp 23—24, Spirtes, et al [2000], pp.1-58) 
   Ignoring details a DAG consists of nodes connected by arrows. In Fig. 1, capital letters, A, B, etc. in plain type are nodes.  These are variables to which values can be assigned to correspond to real or hypothetical values of the items the nodes represent.  Bold capital letters are used for items in the system whose causal structure the graph is constructed to represent.  The arrows represent causal relations whose obtaining among the parts of the system the graph represents would account for statistical patterns in the data obtained from that system. 




   The arrangement of the nodes and arrows are constrained by relations of probabilistic dependence whose obtaining among the parts of the system of interest is inferred from the data.  It is required that the node at the tail of one or more of the arrows must screen off the node at it’s (their) head(s) from every node they lead back to. ​[5]​   Thus in Fig. 1, B screens off C from A, and C screens off D from A, B, and F.  This means that if the causal structure of the real system is as the graph represents it to be, the value of C varies with the values of B and F independently of  the value of A, and the value of D varies with the values of C and E independently of  the values of A, B, and F.  
   For example, let A, in Fig. 1 represent  a physician, A, who may be induced to instruct or not to instruct a patient, B  to increase her daily walking to at least 2 miles a day for some specified period of time.  Being induced to instruct, and being induced not to instruct are the possible values the graph represents as possible for A.  Being instructed and not being instructed to walk the 2 miles are the values the graph represents as possible for  B.  Walking the 2 miles and walking substantially less are the possible values for C.  The value of C is represented  as depending upon B, and  F whose values depend on features of the patient’s neighborhood (e.g., the state of the sidewalks) which determine how conducive it is to walking.  D is blood sugar level or some other component of diabetes, which (as represented by the DAG) may improve or not improve depending partly on the value of  C, but also, on the value of some feature, E, of the patient’s diet such as fat or sugar intake.​[6]​   If things  actually are as Fig. 1 represents them, it would be a good public health policy to get patients do more walking.  If patients always followed their doctors’ advice and such factors as diet could be held constant or corrected for, we could test whether things are as the diagram represents them by getting doctors to prescribe walking, check their patients for signs of diabetes, and check controls who were not told to walk.  If people always walk more in neighborhoods which are conducive to walking, and the DAG represents the causal structure correctly, we could improve publish health by fixing the sidewalks, etc.  Or we could improve walking conditions in a neighborhood to test the diagram.  But in practice any manipulations undertaken to change walking habits would be fat handed rather than immaculate.
   The laws of probability, the relations of probabilistic dependence and independence which can be ascertained from data from the system of interest,​[7]​, assumptions  about the system which produces the data from which the DAG is constructed​[8]​, and the theorems and algorithms which govern the construction and  use of the DAG determine which direct  assignments of values are permissible and which readjustments in the values of other nodes they require us to make.​[9]​.  Thus new values may be assigned directly to C without readjusting A, B, F or E.  But then one may have to assign a new value to D (this will depend on the value of E and the strength of its connection to D).  One may assign a new value to B without adjusting the value of A, F, or E.  But then one may have to adjust the value of C and D (depending on the values of F and E, and the strength of the relevant connections).​[10]​
   Directly assigning a value to a node (without changing the values of any nodes at the tails of arrows which lead to it) represents an ideal intervention.  If the real system were modular (and met all of the other assumptions relevant to the construction and use of its DAG) one could intervene on C with respect to D.  And one could do so in such a way that if the diabetes rate changes, the changes are due only to changes in walking habits and other factors the new walking habits influence.  But in practice, we can expect the diabetes rate to be affected by exogenous factors which operate independently of walking habits.  And we can expect that whatever we do to get the patients to walk more may change the values of other factors which can promote, remedy, or prevent diabetes in ways which have nothing to do with walking.  For example, instructing a patient to walk may frighten her into improving her diet, or set off a binge of nervous ice cream eating.  I	t goes without saying that the results of such fat handed manipulations may differ significantly from the results of ideal interventions represented by assigning values to C. 
   Let ‘IX  RY’ be a counterfactual whose antecedent specifies the assignment of a value to a DAG node, X, and whose consequent specifies a value for  another node, Y.  Let , ‘IX  RY’, be a counterfactual whose antecedent would have been true only if a certain manipulation had actually been performed on X, and whose consequent describes a change in Y which results from Ix. To anticipate some of the argument of the next section, notice that there will be important differences between the evaluations of these counterfactuals.  To evaluate ‘IX  RY’  we must decide what assignments of values to X, are permitted by the algorithms, theorems, etc. governing the DAG which represents the real system, and what  adjustments of the values of other nodes they require.  We can set any permissible value for X we choose even if our choice corresponds to an immaculate manipulation which is never, or cannot ever be performed on X with respect to Y.  The rules, etc. governing the DAG will always us what if any adjustments of the value of Y the proper use of the DAG would require of us.  But the truth value of  ‘’IX  RY’  depends on what would have gone on in the real system if a given intervention had occurred,  What’s wrong with CDep  is that one thing can causally influence another as part of a natural process which does not determine what would have resulted from immaculate manipulations which never (and in some cases can never) occur.  Barring arbitrary assignments of truth values, counterfactuals don’t always have the truth values CDep’s analysis of causal claims requires of them.  I think that some causal claims are both true, and well confirmed even though the counterfactuals whose truth CDep requires in its analysis are neither true nor false.  My reasons for thinking that many of the relevant counterfactuals lack truth values are derived from Belnap’s and his co-authors profound discussion of the semantics of predictions about indeterministic systems.(Belnap, et al [2001])  I sketch them in the next section.  For an example of a causal claim which I believe does not depend for its truth upon the truth of counterfactuals about the results of ideal interventions, see §v. 
	iv.	  Say that a conditional is realized  just in case its antecedent is true, and unrealized just in case its antecedent is not true (false or neither true nor false).  Some conditionals which are unrealized with respect to one time may be realized with respect to another.  Suppose someone predicts now that if there is a sea battle tomorrow, the Officers’ Ball will be postponed.  Suppose that things are up in the air now with regard to the sea battle, and the conditional is unrealized.  It will remain so at least until tomorrow.  If there is a battle tomorrow, the conditional is realized and eventually it will turn out to be either true or false.  If there is no battle it remains unrealized, and will turn out to be vacuously true​[11]​no matter what happens to the Officers’ Ball.  
   Counterfactual conditionals are never realized by what actually happens.​[12]​.  Some (e.g., ‘if Lindsay Davenport’s injury had healed in time for her last match against Venus Williams, she would have beaten her’) are unrealized because things just happen not to turn out as required for the truth of their antecedents. Others (‘if positively charged ions had attracted instead of repelling each other in Ancient Greece, Plato’s brain would have worked differently from ours’) are unrealized because it is logically, physically, or otherwise impossible for their antecedents to be true.  The main contention of this section that the unrealized conditionals whose truth CDep would have us include among the truth conditions of at least some well accepted (and presumably true) causal claims about indeterministic processes are vacuously true at best​[13]​  This is not an epistemological contention; the point is not that we can’t find out whether these unrealized conditionals are true or false. The point is that nothing can make them non-vacuously true. 
   It would not be a good idea to accept my contention and then try to save a counterfactual account of causality by rejecting indeterminism. A theory of causality had better be compatible with indeterminism unless there is compelling argument for determinism.  I know of no such argument; at present the best work in the natural, behavioral, and social sciences makes determinism extremely hard to defend.  Besides that, some versions of determinism don’t allow non-vacuous truth values for all unrealized conditionals.(See p.*p.20 below)  
   It would not be a good idea to accept my contention and say that vacuous truth is good enough.  If the obtaining of a causal relation depends upon whether C is the case in possible worlds or possible histories of this world in which A is the case, the vacuous true of ‘A  C’ in  the actual world tells us nothing of interest about causal connections or disconnections between things to which the counterfactual makes reference.  
   The most familiar attempts to find non-vacuous truth values for counterfactuals come from David Lewis’ and Robert Stalnaker’s  possible world semantics.(Lewis [1973], Stalnaker and Thomason [1970])  According to Lewis, the truth value of ‘A  C’ depends upon whether C is true in possible worlds other than, but similar (to some degree, in some respect) to our own world up to some time before what actually transpired made ‘A’ false.(Lewis [1973] pp.16 ff.) I don’t know of any rigorous, principled way to decide which respects are relevant, or how similar two or more worlds are with respect to them.  The application of Lewis’ semantics to particular examples of causation in the literature typically seems to depend on how the author’s intuitions tell him to weight what she imagines are possible ways in which worlds can differ from or resemble one another.   This is far from satisfactory,  It’s notorious that people’s intuitions differ.  It’s notorious (as Kant’s dismal writings on geometry attest) that imaginability is not a reliable test for possibility.  And philosophers are often unable to imagine their cases in enough detail to determine whether they really are possible or impossible in any interesting sense.​[14]​ 
   A better, because more principled​[15]​, answer to questions about the truth values of counterfactuals can be given by analogy to Belnap’s, Perloff’s, Xu’s, and Green’s (‘Belnap’s’ for short) branching history treatment of predictions about non-determinist systems (Belnap et al [2001].  Ignoring details, and  departing from Belnap in ways which won’t effect my arguments, the idea is very roughly the following. 
   Let  times be durations which last just long enough for things to have values, for manipulations to occur, and for values to change.​[16]​  Let a moment be everything that is going on everywhere at a single time.  Moments are ontological counterparts of Carnap’s state descriptions.  A history is a maximal sequence of causally related moments.  Each history includes one moment at every time from its beginning to its end, ​[17]​, and no more than one moment at any one time.  Assuming indeterminism, the actual history of the world up to the present time, t0, may branch off at any time into two or more possible segments, each of which is a different way things could (physically as well as logically) develop after t0.  Barring wholesale determinism, the actual history of the world up to at least some past times will branch off at those times into one segment containing the sequence of moments containing exactly what actually happened from then up to the present, and one or more other segments whose moments include various things which could have, but did not actually happen.  Each of these latter branches will include at least one thing which could have, but did not go on at any time between the time of the branching and  t0.   Although each segment of each history includes no more than one moment at each time, the same moment may occur as part of more than one segment. (Belnap, et al. [2001] p.30)  Consider the actual history of the world up to the time when I typed the sentence you are now reading.  The actual history of the world includes an earlier moment which includes my turning on my computer.  One possible but non actual history segment includes the actual history of the world up the time when I turned on my computer and everything else that was actually going on then, followed at by a possible moment in which I type a different sentence.  In yet another possible segment, I stop typing altogether go for a walk.  And so on.  Each of these alternative segments shares the moment in which I turned on my computer. (Cp, Belnap [2000] p.30)
   In Fig. 2 below, t0  is the present time and  HA is a segment of the actual history of the world extending from t0  back into the past.  Following Aristotle, assume that nothing at any time can bring it about that what is actually the case now is not the case now.  Assume with Aristotle that nothing can bring it about that what was actually the case at any previous time was not actually the case at that time.  Reverting to an earlier example, suppose that at t0, someone predicts that if (A) a sea battle occurs at a later time, t1, then (B) the Officers’ Ball will be postponed to a later t2.  As Aristotle would  agree, even if a battle at t1 is highly probable at t0, what is probable. doesn’t always happen; no matter how probable it is, the battle still might not be fought.​[18]​, Not enough has been settled by t0 to make A true, and so the prediction is unrealized as things stand at t0,  What was unsettled with regard to the battle at t0 will be settled at  t1 or very shortly before then.  If the battle is fought, S1 joins HA as part of the actual history of the world, and the conditional which was unrealized at t0 is realized at t1.  Things might then develop in such a way as to satisfy C at t2 and turn the conditional a true description of the actual history of the world.  But things might develop in such a way as to satisfy ¬C at t2 and turn the conditional into a false description of the actual history of the world.  On the other hand no matter how improbable it is, it is still possible at t0 for S2 instead of S1 to become part of the actual history of the world.  If so, there is no sea battle at t1, ‘A’ remains forever unsatisfied, and no matter what happens next, the conditional is unrealized, and is at best only vacuously true.  Ending as it does at t0, HA confers no truth value on our conditional.  We may suppose there is enough going on during HA to satisfy the claim that the conditional will turn out to be realized or unrealized; either the battle will be fought at t1 or it will not.  Enough may have been settled to make it highly probable that it will be realized.  But the future conditional has no truth value relative to any time during which it is not determined that there actually is or will be a sea battle at t1.  And even if there is a sea battle at t1, the conditional is neither true nor false relative to any time at which it is not determined whether the Officers’ Ball is or will be postponed. ​[19]​, ​[20]​ (Belnap et al [2001] pp.133--176).
    Some of the segments which branch off from the actual history of the world at the time you make a prediction about a non-deterministic system are such that if they become parts of the actual history of the world your prediction will come true.  If the other segments which branch off at the time you make the prediction become parts of the actual history of the world your prediction will turn out to be false.  Belnap’s point was that because the relevant system is indeterministic there is, at the time you make the prediction, no fact of the matter as to which segment will turn out to be actual.  It follows that the prediction is neither true nor false of the actual history of the world at the time you make it.  Ignoring vacuous truth values, counterfactual claims about indeterministic systems are analogous to predictions in this respect.  
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   Suppose someone claims right now (at t0) that if an intervention on X, IX, had been performed at an earlier time, t –2, then some result, RY,  consisting of a change in the value of Y, would have occurred at some time, t –1, after t2 and before t0.  In symbols, the claim made at t0 is:
	5.	  (IX at t –2)  (RY at t –1) 
  In Figure 3, below the segment of the actual world is indicated by a solid line, and possible segments are indicated by dashed lines.  Since Ix does not actually occur at t0, ‘IX at t0’ is a false description of the actual history of the world, and its denial is true.  RY actually does occur at t –1, but that leaves open what would have happened if the intervention had occurred at t-2. ¬RY  belongs to a non-actual ¬I segment which branches off of HA at t-2.  But that too leaves it open whether RY would have occurred at t-1 if IX had occurred at t-2.  What actually happens after you make a prediction can turn it into a non vacuously true description of the actual history of the world, but if the intervention did not occur at t-2 nothing can happen then or later bring  IX at t-2 into the actual history of the world.  Thus while a conditional prediction can turn out to be non-vacuously true of the actual history of the world, neither 5. nor any other counterfactual can turn out to be non-vacuously by virtue of what actually happens.
   Can the counterfactual be made non-vacuously true by what could have, but did not actually happen?  According to Fig. 3 below, 5. is realized in segments S1 and S2  and is non vacuously true of 2 possible histories which include those segments.  But  It is a false description of 3 other histories which include S1 and S2. If one of the favorable  IX at t-2 histories had turned out to be actual rather than merely possible, RY would have resulted from IX and the counterfactual dependency CDep requires for a causal connection between X and Y would have obtained.  If the any of the other three IX at t-2 histories had turned out to be actual, RY would not have resulted from IX and the counterfactual dependency CDep requires would not have obtained.  Perhaps some of those possible histories had a better chance of becoming actual than others.  Perhaps one of them was highly probable.  Even so, there is no fact of the matter as to which one would have made the grade if the intervention had been performed.  Thus there is no fact of the matter as to whether 5. is true except for the fact that it is non-vacuously true of some possible histories and false relative to others. ​[21]​ 
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Instead all that CDep needs to require is that if Ix had occurred at t -2 , then RY at t-1 would have had a different probability than it had given the non-occurrence of the intervention at t-2. I don’t think this really avoids the difficulty just sketched with regard to 5.  Suppose that CDep maintains that X exerts a causal influence on Y only if, by virtue of how things are at present(at t0), it is the case that
	6.	  IX at t –2  Pr(RY at t –1) ≥ T> Pr(RY  at t -1|¬ IX at t –2).
6. claims that if IX had occurred at t –2, then the probability of RY  at t –1 would have reached or exceeded some threshold level, T, above what it would have been had the intervention not occurred at t –2.  
   I assume that the obtaining or non obtaining of a causally productive relationship between two items, X and Y had better not be construed as depending just upon subjective  probabilities.  For example, according to an adequate account of causality, the truth of George W’s claim that pretzels made him faint should not depend upon how  much he or an ideally rational agent would be willing to bet on fainting conditional on pretzel swallowing, how someone would or should adjust his fainting priors after learning that George W swallowed a lot of pretzels, etc.  It may be (although I don’t see why it need be) that the pretzels caused the fainting only if it would be rational to follow some particular betting strategy.  But that doesn’t mean that to claim the pretzels made George W faint, is to make claims about the strengths of rational agents’ beliefs or betting policies.  If causality is to be understood in terms of probabilities, they had better be objective probabilities  which are as they are independently of what we do or should believe, what bets we do or should take, etc.​[22]​  
   I have no theory about what determines  what the objective probability of RY at t –1 would have had if IX had occurred at t –2,  But whatever it may be, I don’t see how it can fail to be relevant that if the possibilities are as depicted in Fig. 3, the ratio RY at t-1  segments to total segments branching off from S1 is different from the ratio of RY at t-1 to total segments branching off from S2.  If Ry occurred at t –1 in every segment which branches off from a history with  IX at t –2, then for that history, RY couldn’t fail to happen at t –1;  and its probability would be 1.  If RY didn’t occur in any of the segments which branch off from an IX at t –2 history, its probability for that history would be zero.  This suggests that if an IX at t –2 history (like those in Fig. 3) branches into some segments with, and some segments without RY at t –1, then the probability of RY at t –1 for that history should fall somewhere in between 1 and 0, and that its magnitude should depend in some way upon the ratio of RY at t –1  to total branches from the same IX at t-2 history.  If so, the probabilities can vary from history to history.  Suppose we specify a threshold such that 6. is true only if the probability of RY at t –1 would have been .5 or greater if IX had occurred at t –2 .  Then 6. will be true of histories which include S1 and false of histories which include S2.  Perhaps  what actually happened before t-2 gave S1 a better chance to become part of the actual history of the world than S2.  Then 6. should be more probable than its denial.  But that doesn’t make 6. non-vacuously true any more than a low probability conditional on what happened up to t-2 would suffice to make 6. false.,​[23]​   As with 5., 6. is non-vacuously true of some possible histories, and false with regard to others.  And as with 5., there is no fact of the matter as to which of these histories would have been actual had the intervention occurred at 
t-2.  Thus a causal claim whose truth depended upon a probabilistic counterfactual like 6. would be no better off than if it’s truth had depended on 5. 
   If CDep doesn’t work for indeterministic causal processes, what about deterministic ones?  The first thing to say about this is that wholesale determinism is incompatible with CDep, and every other theory which makes essential reference to un-actualized possibilities.  Let t be any past, present, or future time, and let t’ by any successor of t.  By wholesale determinism, I mean that for any given t, and t’, there is exactly one moment, m, such that conditional on what is actually the case at t, the probability that m is actual at t’ is 1, and the probability that any other moment is actual at t’ is 0.
Recall that counterfactuals are conditionals whose antecedents are actually false.  Recall that they have non-vacuous truth values only relative to possible histories in which their antecedents are true.  Given wholesale determinism, there are no such possible histories; every counterfactual is vacuously true! Suppose we imagine a fictitious history in which the antecedent of a counterfactual is true.  Using whatever deterministic laws we think might apply, suppose we imagine what would happen next.  What we have imagined is impossible.  Even if wholesale determinism allowed one to choose what to imagine, the most our imagining would accomplish is to confer truth on such claims as ‘some people imagine fictitious histories in which so and so happens at t, and such and such happens at t’.
   Someone will object that instances of genuine laws of nature would still obtain if wholesale determinism were true, and therefore that under wholesale determinism, it would still be true to say such things as ‘if I were 21 years old today, I would be more than 10 years old today’, or ‘if everything were just as it is now except that the sun had only .00003 of its present mass, the earth would not orbit the sun in the way it does now.’  I think this objection is ill founded.   Whatever mathematical or natural laws may do, they cannot support such counterfactuals given wholesale determinism.  That is because according to wholesale determinism, neither these, nor any other counterfactuals describe what is true of any possible history of the world.  And so, anyone who thinks that laws of nature make it counterfactually the case that instances of A result in instances of C had better believe there is enough indeterminacy to allow that  instances of A could have occurred at times when they did not actually occur.  But that means that the causes of A operate indeterministicaly, and even if for any time tj and any later time, tk, A at tj  C at tk,  there is a cause B such that even though B did not occur at some still earlier  time ti , it could have.  And relative to some possible histories in which B does occur at ti, A at tj has one probability, while in others, it has others.  This allows counterexamples to counterfactual accounts of what it is for B to be a cause of A which are similar to the counterexamples described above with regard to what it is for  X to exert a causal influence on Y.
   Some authors analyze general causal claims (e.g., ‘freezing water causes it to expand’, ‘inadequate blood supply disrupts brain function’) in terms of  conditionals of the form ‘if such and such were to happen then so and so would happen’.(*cites)  Unlike the counterfactuals I have been considering, some of these conditionals can be construed as realizable claims which may eventually turn out to be non-vacuously true.  Suppose for example that several years ago, Lance Armstrong’s doctor told him that if he were to undergo an extreme cancer treatment, he would live to race again.  I want to conclude this section by noting that because some ideal interventions cannot actually occur, what I have been arguing with regard to counterfactuals like ‘IX at t--2  RY at t –1’ applies equally well to conditionals of the form ‘if IX were to happen, then RY would happen’.  where—as is often the case—X influences  Y only as part of an indeterministic causal process, and IX involves an immaculate experimental manipulation which cannot in fact be accomplished.  The same goes for conditional predictions and retrodictions about logically or practically impossible interventions.  In all such cases, even if we can represent the intervention and use a DAG to calculate what values to assign to Y given different assignments of values to X, it does not follow that the relevant conditional claim about an intervention on X with regard to Y can turn out to be non-vacuously true or false.       
	v.	  I agree with Woodward that the notion of an immaculate manipulation of a system which meets the modularity requirement captures 
…the conditions that would have to be met in an ideal experimental manipulation of X performed for the purpose of determining whether X causes Y.(Woodard[2000] p.6)

In many experiments, investigators actually try to wiggle one thing to see what happens to another.  Even though most real world manipulations fail to meet Woodward’s conditions, experimentalists typically try to approximate them as best they can.  It is safe to assume that although experimentalists do not always explicitly mention thinking about ideal experimental manipulations, they often consider them in trying to figure out how best to design and conduct their experiments.  Furthermore I think Deborah Mayo is right to suggest that the interpretation of experimental data often involves calculations undertaken to work around and correct for disparities between the experiment as actually conducted, and an ideal, but unachievable version of the same experiment .(Mayo[1996] p.136)   This means that philosophers may often have to think about  ideal interventions in order to understand how experimental results can contribute to the development and evaluation of causal explanations.   
   But it does not follow from any of this that the causal conclusions experimentalists and theorists draw from experimental results should be understood as involving anything more than claims about what actually results (has actually resulted, or will actually result) from real, real world fat handed manipulations, rather than what would have resulted from immaculate manipulations of ideal systems.​[24]​.  
   I will conclude this paper by describing some rat brain lesioning experiments Karl Lashley conducted to study the role of the visual cortex in learning and performing maze tasks.  Lashley used the results to establish several causal claims which I take to be both true and well supported by his evidence. One such claim is that the visual cortex exerts a causal influence on the ability of both normally sighted and blinded rats  to learn and perform maze running tasks.  Another is that destruction of the visual cortex of a blind rat which has been succesfully trained to run a maze causes the rat to lose its ability to run the maze, and renders it incapable of relearning the maze.  
   In interpreting his experimental results and arguing for his causal conclusions Lashley neither tried to confirm, nor appealed to any counterfactual claims about what would have resulted from ideal interventions.  Of course it’s still possible that counterfactuals about ideal interventions do belong to the contents of Lashley’s causal conclusions, and that Lashley’s failure to confirm or appeal to them constitutes a failure in his interpretation of his data.  But I hope the following description of Lashley’s work will at least make it plausible that this is not the case.  
 Lashley’s general strategy was to try to infer facts about the normal functioning of the visual cortex from whatever performance or learning deficits he could produce by lesioning it.  But the anatomy of the rat brain, and the limitations of the available technology ruled out immaculate manipulations.  Lashley and his assistants could not lesion the visual cortex without damaging nearby brain structures as well.  I claim that in trying to estimate and correct for the effects of such collateral damage, Lashley neither tried, nor needed to evaluate counterfactual claims about what deficits would have resulted from the ideal lesioning experiments he could not actually perform.  .
    Lashley experimented on  the visual cortex in order to test a theory he called ‘strict localization’ (SL hereinafter).  According to SL, each anatomically distinct, macroscopic region of the cerebral cortex is capable of performing one and only one psychological function, and no two regions can do the same job. (Lashley [1960] p.433) Lashley  argued that according to SL, 
	7	  [If] a sense modality is eliminated by removal of the sense organ    
            the corresponding sensory area of the cortex should play no 
            further part in the activities of the animal, and its destruction 
            should not affect habits acquired [by training] after sense privation 
            (Lashley [1960] p.433).
 
Lashley assumed that if SL is correct and the visual cortex has a single function, that function is the ‘reception and integration of visual impulses’ (Lashley [1960] p.452).  Thus as 7. says, the visual cortex should be incapable of functioning without visual input.  Accordingly, if SL is correct, then if an animal is successfully trained to run a maze after its eyes have been destroyed, the visual cortex will have made no contribution to the training or the animal’s subsequent maze performance.
   The ideal way to test this on rats would be to blind them, train them to run the maze, and then lesion their visual cortices (by which Lashley means the striate or occipital cortices) without damaging any other parts of the brain.(Lashley [1960] p.435)  If performance is impaired then, contrary to SL,  the visual cortex must be capable of at least two functions.  One of them requires visual input and is lost when the eyes are destroyed.  A second function in the blinded rat’s maze training or performance, and requires no visual input..  Its loss would explain why the rat performs so badly after its visual cortex is lesioned.(Lashley [1960]p.433)  
   As said, Lashley’s actual experiments fell far short of this ideal.  He could destroy the eyes while sparing the brain behind them, but he could not destroy  enough of the visual cortex to influence the animal’s maze performance without damaging adjacent parcels of brain. (Lashley [1960] p.434 ff.)  To work around this difficulty, Lashley lesioned the visual cortex in a variety of different ways, each one of which was designed to do collatoral damage to a somewhat different adjacent structure. For example, in one group of rats, the hippocampal lobes were lesioned along with the visual cortex, and the auditory cortex was spared.  In another group, the auditory cortex was damaged and the hippocampal lobes were spared.  And so on for each of the adjacent regions which were damaged whenever the visual cortex was lesioned.  In a final group Lashley lesioned the visual cortex while sparing as much of the rest of the brain as he could.  Lashley couldn’t spare exactly the same amount of adjacent tissue in each rat in this last group, but no one region outside the visual cortex sustained as much damage as in the group in which it was deliberately damaged along with the visual cortex.
   To measure the effects of these lesions Lashley compared the number and the kinds of post operative maze errors he observed to the number and kinds of errors the same rats had been observed to make after their eyes had been destroyed and before they were retrained up to standard performance.​[25]​  
   The performance of all of the rats was much worse after the lesioning.  Although they had  relearned the maze after blinding, they could not be successfully retrained after their visual cortices had been lesioned.  Lashley used statistical arguments to conclude that that total destruction of the visual cortex together with as little damage as could be managed to any one of 5 nearby structures did not cause significantly more errors in running the maze than destruction of the visual cortex together with one or more of the others..​[26]​  A sixth region, the postauditory cortex, was damaged whenever the visual cortex was completely destroyed, but surprisingly, rats with maximal  damage to the post auditory cortex performed considerably better than rats with minimal damage to this region.(Lashley [1960] p.446)  Lashley concluded:
Analysis of the effects of destruction of the area striata [the visual cortex] in combination with damage to various other structures indicates that the latter did not contribute significantly to the loss of the maze habit.(Lashley [1960] p.446). 
 
Furthermore, maze performance deteriorated at least as much (sometimes more) after destruction of the visual cortex than it had when only the eyes were destroyed.(Lashley [1960] p.453).  Assuming that the psychological function of a brain structure corresponds to the deficit which results when it is lesioned, 
[t]he visual cortex has some important function in maze learning which is exercised in the absence of any visual stimuli.(Lashley [1960] p.453).

If so, then contrary to SL, the visual cortex can perform two functions.  
   Lashley believed his experiments established that the destruction of the visual cortices of his eyeless rats caused an observable deterioration in maze performance, and greatly interfered with further maze training.  According to CDep, this causal claim commits Lashley to counterfactual claims about what would have happened if he had achieved ideal interventions on the visual cortex with regard to maze learning and performance.  CDep would lead one to expect that Lashley at least ought to have  tried to marshal some evidence for plausibility of those counterfactuals.  In fact, he did no such thing.  What follows is the closest of anything I could find in Lashley’s paper to an argument for a counterfactual claim about what would have resulted from an unperformed manipulation.​[27]​.   When Lashley tried to retrain the rats whose visual cortices he had lesioned, they performed so poorly that he gave up after 50 trials, remarking that if further retraining had been attempted
[e]xtrapolation of the learning curves indicates that the group would not have reached the criterion with an average of 700 errors…. (Lashley [1960] p.442)

 This is a counterfactual claim all right, but all it tells is what would have resulted from further training if the learning curve remained the same after the first 50 trials.  Lashley did not use this trivial counterfactual to argue for his claim about the effect of the lesions on maze learning.  Instead, he rested his case on the factual claim that
[e]ven though training was not continued to the criterion, almost ten times as many errors were made after occipital lesion as after peripheral blinding [caused by destroying the eyes, or lesioning connections from them to the visual cortex].(ibid)

 Instead of trying to confirm a counterfactual to support of  his claim about the causal role of the optical cortex, he argued from an actual fact about how his rats had actually performed after the lesioning.  
   Someone might object that counterfactuals could belong to the contents of  Lashley’s causal claims even though he did nothing to confirm them.  I suppose they could.  But if they do, Lashley’s failure to confirm them counts against the plausibility of what seem to me to be well supported causal claims.  Someone might object that Lashley does have evidence for the counterfactuals Woodward would want to include in his causal claims.  For if  Lashley’s evidence supports his causal claims, then it also supports whatever counterfactuals are included in their contents.  But this begs the question of whether the truth or plausibility of Lashley’s causal claims actually can depend upon the truth or plausibility of never to be realized counterfactuals about the results of ideal interventions.  Someone might object that this case is atypical.  I don’t think it is, but even if it were, it still provides at least one counterexample to the idea that in order to confirm a causal claim we need to confirm a counterfactual claim.  And this makes it plausible that at least Lashley’s causal claims do not incorporate Woodwardian counterfactuals.  
   This leaves open the question of how to explicate the (apparently correct) claim that if X exerts a causal influence on Y, one can wiggle Y by wiggling X without resorting to counterfactuals.  But that is a topic for another paper.
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^1	  This paper descends from a talk I gave at a Pittsburgh-University of London workshop on philosophy of biology and neuroscience at Birkbeck College on 9/11/01.  I am indebted to the participants for helpful discussion, including Peter Machamer who also suggested its motto.  Section iv draws heavily on Nuel Belnap’s and his co-authors profound discussion of predictions about indeterministic systems.  I don’t know how much of what I’ve said Belnap agrees with, but I am grateful for his patience in answering my ill informed questions about his semantics.  I’ve also had helpful comments from Clark Glymour and Jim Woodward who definitely do not agree with what I say, and from Sandra Mitchell Francis Longworth, Alan Hajek, and Deborah Bogen. 
^2	  The most widely accepted counterfactual account of causality is David Lewis’ according to which, if c and e are actual events, c causes e only if (for deterministic causes) e would not have occurred had c not occurred, or (for non-deterministic causes), the probability of e’s occurrence would have been substantially lower had c not occurred. (Lewis [1986] ‘Causation’ in Lewis [1986] p.167ff, 175.) According to what used to be the most widely accepted accounts, c causes e only if a canonical description of e can be derived from a canonical description of initial conditions including c, and a law or lawlike generalization.  Closely related Humean accounts require occurrences of c and e to be instances of lawful, natural regularities.  Proponents of such views maintained that the difference between lawlike or lawful and accidentally true generalizations is that the former, but not the latter, secure the truths of counterfactuals.  And similarly for the difference between lawful and accidental natural regularities. (See Goodman [1965] pp.3—30)  Although I will not discuss them in this paper, I hope its relevance to these will be apparent.
^3	  As is customary in the literature, I use the term ‘value’ broadly.  Values include a thing’s qualitative as well as quantitative states, its features, conditions, etc., Existence and non existence at a given time or place are values.  Thus, being present in large quantities in the lining of your throat is one value for diphtheria bacteria; being absent is another.  Inflammation is one value for your throat; lack of inflammation is another.  Red, green, and puce are values of colored objects.  And so on.
^4	  The relation between angle and acceleration needn’t hold for angles so large that the block falls off the plane, or so small that it stops moving. 
^5	   An arrow leads back to X if it has X at its tail.  Or if its tail is at the head of another arrow with X at its tail. And so on. 
^6	 .  I am indebted to Wendy King for telling me about some considerably more interesting and sophisticated research of hers on which this example is loosely based.  Notice that while B is represented as screened off by a single factor, C is  represented as screened off by two together 
^7	   The following detail I’ve ignored is extremely important in other contexts. To construct a DAG one applies the algorithms (supplemented by whatever knowledge if any is available concerning the system to be represented) to statistical distributions among data produced by observing or performing experiments on the system of interest.  But in most cases, all the algorithms can deliver is not a single DAG, but a class of different graphs, each of which represents a somewhat different causal setup which is capable of producing data which are the same in all relevant respects.(Spirtes & Scheiness in McKim and Turner, p.166)
^8	   For example, it may be, but is not always, assumed that the values of the items represented by nodes in a graph do not have any common causes which are unrepresented in the graph.(Glymour in McKim and Turner [1997] p. 217.  For more assumptions, see Scheiness in McKim and Turner [1997] pp.193 ff, and Glymour in McKim and Turner, pp. 206 ff., 209, ff. and 319 ff.
^9	   It is worth noting that Glymour, Spirtes, Scheiness emphatically do not believe that real  systems meet all of the conditions (including the one which corresponds to modularity) they elaborate for DAG modeling.  Indeed, they conceive their project not so much as determining what can be learned from statistical data about systems which meet all of them, as figuring out what if anything can be learned when one or more of their conditions are not met, and what, if anything, can be done to decide whether a given condition is satisfied by the system which produced the data used to construct the graph.(Glymour in McKim, p.210, 217)
^10	  I say ‘may have to adjust ’ instead of ‘must adjust’ because, e.g., the influence of B may cancel out that of a new value assigned to F so that C retains its original value.
^11	  Or—depending on your logical preferences--it will have a third truth value, will be truth valueless, or will be false
^12	  This is a terminological stipulation.  In requiring the antecedents of counterfactuals to be false descriptions of the actual world, it fits the standard literature.  But unlike Goodman and others, I allow counterfactuals to have consequents which are actually true.(Goodman [1965] p.36.  Some philosophers include subjunctives like ‘this property would bring $200000.00 if it were sold to a willing buyer by a willing seller’ under the heading of counterfactuals. This leaves room for saying that what happens later on (a will buyer purchases the property from a willing seller) can realize the counterfactual. 
^13	   I won’t claim that none of the relevant counterfactuals have non-vacuous truth values.  It’s plausible that some causes operate  deterministically.  It’s conceivable that there are non-vacuously true unrealized conditional claims to be made in connection with some indeterministic causal interactions.  It will serve my purposes if the counterfactuals CDep and other such theories include among the truth conditions of just some well accepted causal claims lack non-vacuous truth values.
^14	  *Note on Kant, and measuring the sizes of miracles.  Lewis [1986] pp.44ff.,  and Ellis [2001]p.281.
^15	  *note on why it’s more principled
^16	   Belnap’s times are point instants.(Belnap et al [2001] p.139)  Mine are longer because many manipulations and changes take at least little while to occur, and it takes a while for an entity to have some of the values in the examples we’ll be looking at.  Perhaps this could be avoided by decomposing my times into instants, and decomposing manipulations and values into components which take no more than an instant. 
^17	   If everything stops happening so that nothing is going on at some time, t, then the moment which is actual at t (and from then on, I suppose) is barren; it includes everything that’s actually going on at t, but what’s actually going on then is nothing at all. 
^18	   Aristotle [1995] pp.28-30
^19	   The same goes, of course, for non-conditional predictions like (Aristotle’s own example) ‘there will be a sea battle tomorrow.’ (Aristotle [1995] p.30, 19a/30ff) If the world is indeterministic, the truth value of this prediction cannot be settled until tomorrow comes.  And I suppose the same goes for the non-conditional probabilistic prediction ‘tomorrow morning, the probability of a sea battle occurring tomorrow afternoon will be .8’.
^20	  *note that where I say ‘is true’, Belnap says ‘is settled true’ etc., etc.
^21	   *Alan Hajek has a highly plausible argument for this kind of conclusion, based on intuitive considerations which do not assume Belnap’s semantics.  In correspondence, Woodward says he considers counterfactuals like the ones I’ve been considering to be false where indeterminism holds. 
^22	   Woodward's idea that control and manipulation lie at the heart of our idea of causality is hard to understand except as according with this assumption. 
^23	  David Papineau suggested the probabilities might propagate along the actual history of world in such a way as to rule out of all but one of the possible segments in which the intervention occurs.  If 1/2 is the probability required by 6. for RY at t –1 conditional on IX at t –2, then 6 is non vacuously true if the probabilities propagate in such a way as to rule out every alternative to HA except S1, and false if only S2 remains possible relative to what was actually the case just before t –2.  I suppose the probabilities could propagate in such a way as to make 6. true, but I see no reason why they should. Or why (as would follow from this development of CDep’s proposal that counterfactuals are part of the contents of causal claims) the probabilities should propagate as Papineau suggested they might as required by CDep for every true causal claim.  Papineau raised this possibility in a coffee shop during a break in the London workshop.  He was going to tell me more when we happened to looked up at the coffee shop’s TV just in time to see the first of  the twin towers explode.  This ended our discussion.  Clark Glymour objected by email to an early draft of this paper that in assuming that the probability of RY at t –1) depended on how many segments included it, I was also assuming—as I had no reason to do—that there are only countably many possible histories which realize the counterfactual.  If there were uncountably many, 6. couldn’t be non-vacuously true or false if the truth of its consequent depended on how many segments include RY at t –1.  But why shouldn’t the probability of RY at t –1 (and therefore,  the truth value of the counterfactual) depend upon a non-counting probability measure of some kind?  Why couldn’t that measure be such that 6. turns out to have non-vacuous truth value?  I have no answer to this question because [a] I don’t know what the possibility space would have to be like in order to prevent the uncountably many possible IX at t –2 segments from gathering into countably many groups, some of which are truly described by 6. and some of which are not?  [b] I don’t know what kind of non-counting probability measure would apply to a possibility which didn’t allow such groupings.  Thus [c] I don’t know whether the principled application of a non-counting probability measure would make  counterfactuals like 6. true where CDep needs them to be.     The issue Glymour’s objection raises is crucial to prospects for counterfactual analyses of causality.  A clear attraction of non-counterfactual accounts of causality is that they are not hostage to the development of plausible, non-counting measures of probabilities which deliver the results which counterfactual accounts might require for their plausibility. 
^24	  I don’t know whether or on what grounds Glymour and his colleagues would disagree.  As I read it, Glymour [1997], p.317, leaves open the possibility of an analysis of the notion of causality, which somehow involves counterfactual dependencies.  But Glymour emphatically does not see his use of Bayes nets to study causal structures as assuming or implying that there is or can be any such analysis.  Counterfactuals are used to construct an manipulate DAGs in order to discover casual structures—not to analyse causality.
^25	  After retraining, and before visual cortex lesioning, the blind rats’ performance was not notably worse than it had been after they had been trained and before they were blinded. (Lashley [1960] pp.437, 438). 
^26	   The 5 structures were the hippocampal lobes, the auditory cortex, the lateral nucleus, pars principalis, the retrosplial areas (anterior nuclei) and the subicular areas.(Lashley [1960] p.446).
^27	   The version of Lashley’s paper I consulted is slightly abridged, but all that’s missing is one or a few tables.(Lashley [1960] p.viii.)
